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1  INTRODUCTION
The Special Court for Sierra Leone1 (SCSL) (now the Residual Special 
Court for Sierra Leone)2 convicted various offenders of crimes, such as 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. These convicted offenders 
were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to fifty years’ 
imprisonment. The SCSL signed sentence-enforcement agreements 
with Sweden, Finland, Rwanda and the United Kingdom.3 On the 
basis of these enforcement agreements, those convicted by the SCSL 
were transferred to serve their sentences in Rwanda4 and the United 
* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, 
and Research Fellow, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape; 
djmujuzi@gmail.com. I am grateful to my colleague, Dr Hermanus van der 
Merwe, for his thoughts on some of the issues I have dealt with in this article. 
The usual caveats apply.
1 For the background of events leading up to the establishment of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone, see, for example, Celina Schocken ‘The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone: Overview and recommendations’ (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 436.
2 When the SCSL completed all the cases it was established to deal with, it wound 
up its business. It was replaced by the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
website available at <http://www.rscsl.org/> (accessed on 15 January 2015).
3 For a discussion of the features of this agreement see Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi 
‘The enforcement of sentences imposed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL): Examining the Agreement between the SCSL and the Government of 
Rwanda’ (2010) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 111-120.
4 See The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Residual Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Freetown and The Hague ‘Detention unit’, available at <http://www.rscsl.
org/detention.html> (accessed on 15 January 2015).
AYIHL_2014_Text.indd   154 26/03/2015   12:51
THE CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE OF OFFENDERS 155
Kingdom.5 Some of those convicted of contempt of court served 
their sentences in Sierra Leone.6 The enforcement of the sentences 
is governed by Articles 227 and 238 of the Statute of the SCSL,9 read 
with Rules 103 and 124 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which 
provide for the place of imprisonment of the offenders convicted by 
the SCSL and the issue of pardon respectively. The conditional early 
release (what is known as parole in some countries)10 of the offenders 
is governed by the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release 
of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.11 As at the 
end of 2014, only two offenders – Moinina Fofana and Eric Koi Senessie 
– had been granted conditional release by the President of the SCSL. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the issues emerging from these 
two cases. Before I deal with those issues, it is important to draw a 
distinction between the transfer of offenders between countries and 
the transfer of offenders from international criminal tribunals, such as 
the SCSL, to sentence enforcement states.
2  THE FEATURES OF THE TRANSFER OF OFFENDERS 
FROM INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS TO 
ENFORCEMENT STATES
For many years there have been agreements, bilateral and multilateral, 
on the transfer of offenders between states. A key feature of these 
5 Charles Taylor is serving is 50-year sentence in the United Kingdom. See Order 
Designating State in Which Charles Ghankay Taylor Is to Serve His Sentence, 4 
October 2013, available at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/
Appeal/1391/SCSL-03-01-ES-1391.PDF> (accessed on 3 November 2014).
6 See Eleventh and Final Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (December 2013) 17-18, available at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/
AnRpt11.pdf> (accessed on 3 November 2014).
7 Article 22 provides that ‘1. Imprisonment shall be served in Sierra Leone. If 
circumstances so require, imprisonment may also be served in any of the States 
which have concluded with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia an agreement for 
the enforcement of sentences, and which have indicated to the Registrar of the 
Special Court their willingness to accept convicted persons. The Special Court 
may conclude similar agreements for the enforcement of sentences with other 
States. 2. Conditions of imprisonment, whether in Sierra Leone or in a third 
State, shall be governed by the law of the State of enforcement subject to the 
supervision of the Special Court. The State of enforcement shall be bound by the 
duration of the sentence, subject to Article 23 of the present Statute.’
8 Which is reproduced in part 3 of this article.
9 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002) reproduced in Christine 
Van den Wyngaert International Criminal Law: A Collection of International and 
European Instruments 3 ed (2005) 307; the text of the Statute is also available 
at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf> (accessed on 24 February 
2015).
10 For example in South Africa. 
11 Of 1 October 2013, available at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/PRACTICE_
DIRECTION_Conditional_Early_Release.pdf> (accessed on 24 February 2015). 
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agreements is that the offender is convicted by a court in the sentencing 
state for breaking the law of that state and he is transferred to a state of 
his nationality or with which he has close ties to serve his sentence.12 
In Krajisnik v the United Kingdom13 the European Court of Human Rights 
drew the distinction between the transfer of offenders between states 
on the one hand and the transfer of offenders from an international 
criminal tribunal to the enforcement state. The Court held that:
[T]he transfer of a prisoner pursuant to such an agreement [between an 
international tribunal and the enforcement state] cannot be likened to 
the transfer of prisoners between a convicting and a receiving State under 
bilateral and multilateral prisoner transfer treaties. In the latter case, the 
sentence could be enforced in the convicting State but the detainee’s transfer 
to another State, usually his home State, is arranged to accommodate his own 
wishes or pursuant to a deportation order of the convicting State. Because 
such transfers are optional, in the sense that if not effected the sentence 
can nonetheless continue to be enforced in the convicting State, there is 
generally some scope for conversion of sentences; and the enforcement of 
the sentence, including questions of early release, is usually a matter solely 
for the receiving State …. If the convicting State is not satisfied with the 
proposed arrangements in the receiving State, it can refuse to allow the 
transfer. In the former case however … the transfer is required in order for 
the sentence to be enforced. In agreeing to accept persons convicted by 
the ICTY, receiving States are in essence agreeing to act, in respect of those 
prisoners, as penal establishments of the ICTY. In these circumstances, and 
given the gravity of the offences leading to a conviction by the ICTY, it is 
not unreasonable that the link between the ICTY and the supervision of the 
enforcement of the sentence is maintained after transfer.14
The above observations, although made by the European Court of 
Human Rights relating to a case from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, should apply with equal force to 
the transfer of offenders between the SCSL and the enforcement states. 
The following points should therefore be noted about these transfers. 
One, the SCSL does not have its own prisons. It has to rely on the 
enforcement state to have its prison sentences executed and therefore 
the transfer of the offenders is not optional. Two, the enforcement 
state cannot convert the sentence of the transferred offender. It has to 
continue with the enforcement of the sentence imposed by the SCSL. 
It should be recalled that there is a difference between converting the 
sentence of the transferred offender (conversion) on the one hand and 
continuing with the enforcement of the sentence of the transferred 
12 For a detailed discussion of the conditions in these agreements and the features 
of these agreements, see UNDOC, Handbook on the International Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons (2012), available at <http://www.unodc.org/documents/
justice-and-prison-reform/11-88322_ebook.pdf> (accessed on 3 November 
2014).
13 ECHR Momčilo Krajisnik v the United Kingdom (23 October 2012) Application 
No 6017/11, available at <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-114635> (accessed on 24 February 2015) .
14 Supra at para 57.
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offender (continued enforcement) on the other hand.15 The issue 
of whether or not the offender’s sentence will be converted after 
the transfer is critical in determining whether the offender (where 
his consent is required)16 and the sentencing and the enforcement 
states will agree to the transfer. Some states will not consent to the 
transfer if the offender’s sentence will be converted into that of the 
enforcement state whereas other states take different approaches.17 
Three, the objective of the transfer is not to accommodate the interests 
of the offender. It is to serve the interests of the SCSL in seeing that 
its sentences are executed and the interests of the international 
community as a whole in seeing that the offender is punished for the 
15 The Explanatory Report on the Council of Europe’s Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons differentiates between conversion and continued 
enforcement as follows: ‘49. Where the administering State opts for the 
“continued enforcement” procedure, it is bound by the legal nature as well 
as the duration of the sentence as determined by the sentencing State …: the 
first condition (“legal nature”) refers to the kind of penalty imposed where 
the law of the sentencing State provides for a diversity of penalties involving 
deprivation of liberty, such as penal servitude, imprisonment or detention. 
The second condition (“duration”) means that the sentence to be served 
in the administering State, subject to any later decision of that State on, for 
example, conditional release or remission, corresponds to the amount of the 
original sentence, taking into account the time served and any remission 
earned in the sentencing State up to the date of transfer. 50. If the two States 
concerned have different penal systems with regard to the division of penalties 
or the minimum and maximum lengths of sentence, it might be necessary for 
the administering State to adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure 
prescribed by its own law for a similar offence. [The convention] … allows that 
adaptation within certain limits: the adapted punishment or measure must, as 
far as possible, correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced; 
it must not aggravate, by its nature or duration, the sanction imposed in the 
sentencing State; and it must not exceed the maximum prescribed by the law 
of the administering State. In other words: the administering State may adapt 
the sanction to the nearest equivalent available under its own law, provided 
that this does not result in more severe punishment or longer detention …[T]he 
procedure under Article 10.2 enables the administering State merely to adapt the 
sanction to an equivalent sanction prescribed by its own law in order to make 
the sentence enforceable. The administering State thus continues to enforce the 
sentence imposed in the sentencing State, but it does so in accordance with the 
requirements of its own penal system.’ Available at <http://conventions.coe.int/
treaty/en/reports/html/112.htm> (accessed on 24 February 2015).
16 See, for example, ECHR Buijen v Germany (Application No 27804/05) (1 April 
2010) 438, where the European Court of Human Rights found that one of the 
reasons why the offender pleaded guilty to the charges against him was because 
he had been promised by the prosecutor that he would be transferred to serve his 
sentence in The Netherlands on condition that his sentence would be converted 
under Dutch law. 
17 See JD Mujuzi ‘Prisoner transfer to South Africa: Some of the likely challenges 
ahead’ (2013) 16:3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 151 at 169-170. 
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offences he committed.18 Four, with regards to the transfer of offenders 
between states, in many cases after the transfer the offender’s sentence 
is governed by the law of the administering state without the sentencing 
state monitoring the manner in which the sentence is being enforced. 
However, in cases where the offender has been transferred from the 
SCSL to the enforcement state, the sentence is governed by the law 
of the enforcement state but the SCSL still has control over the early 
release of the offender. This brings us to the issue of early release by 
the SCSL.
3  EARLY RELEASE
The early release of the offenders is governed by Article 23 of the 
Statute of the SCSL which provides that:
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person 
is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, 
the State concerned shall notify the Special Court accordingly. There shall 
only be pardon or commutation of sentence if the President of the Special 
Court, in consultation with the judges, so decides on the basis of the 
interests of justice and the general principles of law.
Article 23 of the Statute should be read with Rule 124 which provides 
that ‘[t]here shall only be pardon or commutation of sentence if the 
President of the Special Court, in consultation with the judges, so 
decides on the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles 
of law.’ Article 23 of the Statute of the SCSL makes it very clear that 
the pardon or commutation of the sentence is governed by the law of 
the enforcement state. However, the decision to pardon a prisoner or 
to commute his sentence has to be made by the President of the SCSL. 
For the President to make the decision in question he has to consult 
with the judges who imposed the sentence on the prisoner and the 
decision has to be based on two grounds, both of which have to be in 
place: the interests of justice and the general principles of law. Article 
23 of the Statute is operationalised by the Practice Direction on the 
Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.19 The Practice Direction on the Conditional Early 
Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone deals 
18 Some people have argued that these days the objective of the transfer of 
offenders between countries is to serve the interests of the sentencing countries 
as opposed to those of the offenders being transferred. See Dirk van Zyl Smit and 
John R Spencer ‘The European dimension to the release of sentenced prisoners’ 
in Nicola Padfield, Dirk van Zyl Smit and Frieder Dünkel (eds) Release from 
Prison: European Policy and Practice (2010) 43; and M Cherif Bassiouni ‘United 
States policies and practices on execution of foreign penal sentences’ in M 
Cherif Bassiouni (ed) International Criminal Law Vol II: Multilateral and Bilateral 
Enforcement Mechanisms 3 ed (2008) 588.
19 Op cit note 11.
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with different issues relating to the early release of offenders, such as 
eligibility for consideration for conditional early release,20 initiating 
the process to determine eligibility for conditional early release,21 
determination of eligibility for consideration for conditional release,22 
duties of the registrar,23 participation in the determination process,24 
confidentiality,25 determination of application for conditional early 
release,26 post-decision procedure,27 execution of the decision,28 
review of conditions of release,29 violations of conditions of release,30 
expiration of sentence,31 and applicability.32 It is beyond the scope of 
this article to deal with all the aspects of the Practice Direction on the 
Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. This article will focus on those provisions of the Practice 
Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone which have been invoked in the two 
decisions so far.
3.1  Eligibility for Consideration for Early Release
Article 2 of the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of 
Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides for the 
criteria which an offender has to meet before he is eligible for release. 
Article 2(A) provides that an offender ‘shall be eligible for consideration 
for Conditional Early Release no sooner than upon serving two-thirds 
of his total sentence provided that he meets the requirements’ under 
Article 2(B)–(D). In terms of Article 2(A), the offender has a right to be 
considered for early release after serving two-thirds of the sentence. 
However, that does not mean that he has a right to be released. In 
Prosecutor v Senessie33 the President of the SCSL referred to Article 23 
and to Rule 124 and held that ‘a Convicted Person has no entitlement 
to Conditional Early Release from his or her sentence.’34 The President 
added that in deciding whether or not to conditionally release the 
offender, ‘he merely considers, on the basis of facts supplied and the 
20 Article 2.
21 Article 3.
22 Article 4.
23 Article 5.
24 Article 6.
25 Article 7.
26 Article 8.
27 Article 9.
28 Article 10.
29 Article 11.
30 Article 12.
31 Article 13.
32 Article 14.
33 SCSL Prosecutor v Eric Koi Senessie (Decision of the President on Application for 
Conditional Early Release) (4 June 2014) Case No SCSL-11-01-ES.
34 Supra at para 15.
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applicable law, whether it is safe and proper for the convict to serve 
the remaining part of his sentence other than in prison.’35 Before an 
offender is considered for early release, he has to show that he has 
served at least two-thirds of the sentence otherwise his application will 
be dismissed as premature. For example, this is what happened when 
one of the offenders submitted his application before he had served 
two-thirds of the sentence.36
In terms of Article 3(A) of the Practice Direction on the Conditional 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, ‘[t]he process to determine eligibility for Conditional Early 
Release shall be initiated’ by the state in which the offender is serving 
his sentence. For the state to initiate the process, Article 3(A)(i) requires 
the prisoner to directly apply to the state in question and copy his 
application to the registrar of the SCSL. Failure by the offender to 
follow the procedure above will lead to the rejection of his application. 
This is what happened to one prisoner’s initial application when he 
submitted his application to the registrar directly.37 The facts are 
not clear as to why the prisoner did not follow the procedure under 
Article 3(A)(i). If this happened because the prisoner was not aware of 
the procedure to follow, then it means that there is a need for all the 
prisoners to be educated on the relevant procedure to be followed in 
applying for conditional early release. If it happened because of any 
reason, that reason has to be investigated, and if there are problems, 
they must be solved.
Under Article 2(B) for a prisoner to be eligible for consideration 
for conditional early release, he ‘shall demonstrate’ the following: 
successful completion of any remedial, educational, moral, spiritual 
or other programme to which he was referred to within the prison; 
that he is not a danger to the community or to any member of the 
public; and that he complied with the terms and conditions of his 
imprisonment. However, the form which he is required to complete in 
the process of the application has two additional requirements which 
are slightly different from those which appear under Article 2(B). The 
first requirement is that the offender has to show that he does not ‘pose 
a risk of danger to the community or to any member of the public, in 
particular the witnesses who testified against me’ and that the offender 
has done nothing during his incarceration ‘to incite against the peace 
and security of the People of Sierra Leone, either personally or through 
others.’38 It is argued that there is a need to harmonise the requirements 
35 Supra at para 15.
36 SCSL Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Decision of the President 
on Application for Conditional Early Release) (11 August 2014) Case No SCSL-
04-14-ES para 3.
37 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at para 3.
38 See Annex A to the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of 
Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Form A(1). 
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in the form with those under Article 2(B) so that the offenders know 
exactly what is required of them. Most importantly, the validity of the 
form could be questioned if it is contrary to the provision it is meant to 
give effect to. Another challenge with Article 2(B) is that it appears that 
the offender does not have to choose which programmes to participate 
in while in prison. The offender has to be referred to those programmes. 
The danger is that the offender may participate in those programmes 
not because he believes that they are essential to his rehabilitation, but 
simply to increase his chances of early release.
3.2  Determination of Application for Conditional Early Release
Article 8 of the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of 
Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides the 
criteria that the President of the SCSL has to follow in determining 
the outcome of the application for early release. Below I will deal with 
each of the criteria and illustrate how each has been given effect to in 
practice.
3.2.1  Consulting with the judges who imposed the sentence
Article 8(A) provides that ‘[i]n determining the application for 
Conditional Early Release, the President shall consult with the Judges 
who imposed the sentence if available or, if unavailable, at least two 
other judges.’ Article 8(B) provides that:
The President, in consultation with the judges and based on the written 
record and the oral submissions, if any, shall determine whether the 
Convicted Person has shown clear and convincing evidence that he will 
be a safe member of society and comply with the conditions imposed by a 
Conditional Early Release Agreement.
The above two provisions require the President to ‘consult with the 
judges’ or to act ‘in consultation with the judges’ before he makes a 
decision. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa39 the President emphasised 
the fact that the conditional early release of the offender ‘is not 
exercisable on whim or caprice, but in consultation with the Judges 
who imposed the sentence where possible and on the basis of the 
interests of justice and the general principles of law.’40 The Practice 
Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone is not clear on whether the President 
is bound by the views expressed by the judges in question. In some 
jurisdictions, such as South Africa, courts have held that:
[W]hen a statutory provision requires a decision-maker to act ‘in consultation 
with’ another functionary, it means that there must be concurrence 
between the two. This is to be distinguished from the requirement of ‘after 
39 Supra.
40 Supra at para 11.
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consultation with’, which demands no more than that the decision must 
be taken after consultation with and giving serious consideration to the 
views of the other functionary, which may be at variance with those of the 
decision-maker.41
If the above interpretation were to be applied to Article 8 of the Practice 
Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, it would mean that there would 
have to be consensus between the President and the judges that 
the offender should or should not be conditionally released early. 
Jurisprudence emanating from the SCSL shows that the President 
has indeed consulted with the judges before deciding on whether or 
not to conditionally release the offender early. In Prosecutor v Fofana 
and Kondewa42 the President indicates that he had to consult with the 
judges before deciding whether or not the offender was eligible for 
conditional early release because that is a requirement under Article 
8(B) and that ‘their views form part of the process through which I have 
to make my decision.’43 The President received written comments from 
two judges who took part in imposing the sentence on the prisoner. He 
writes that ‘[o]ne report was supportive of the application but the other 
expressed serious reservations mainly because Fofana has not, at any 
stage, acknowledged his own responsibility and the leadership role he 
played in the armed conflict.’44 The judge concluded that Fofana has 
not understood that it was unacceptable to violate the laws of war in 
an armed conflict even if you are fighting for a just cause. The judge 
recommended that before he is released, he should be trained ‘on the 
nature of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone, the convictions meted 
out for those crimes and the responsibility which the prisoner has to 
take for serious violations of International Humanitarian Law.’45 The 
President observed that the above factors ‘are not in favour of granting 
the application for conditional early release. But they must be considered 
against the evaluation of other factors ….’46 The President allowed the 
application on condition that the offender served six more months 
in prison during which period he was to be trained on international 
humanitarian law issues.47 In Prosecutor v Senessie48 the President wrote 
that in deciding that the prisoner was eligible for conditional early 
release, he ‘consulted with the Judge who imposed the sentence.’49 The 
decision is silent on what the consultation in question entailed and in 
41 See SCA National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Freedom Under Law 
(Judgment of 14 April 2014) SA Law Reports (2014) 4 para 38.
42 Supra.
43 Supra at para 18.
44 Supra at para 18.
45 Supra at para 19.
46 Supra at para 20.
47 Supra at para 47.
48 Supra.
49 Supra at para 9.
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particular whether the judge who was consulted was supportive of the 
prisoner’s application for conditional early release.
At least two important points emerge from the discussion above. 
One, the President has the ultimate say on whether or not the 
offender should be conditionally released. The judges’ views have to be 
considered against the evaluation of other factors. In other words, even 
if the judges are opposed to the offender’s release but the President is 
of the view that he should be released, he could go ahead and release 
him. The second point that emerges from the above discussion is the 
appropriateness of the rehabilitation programmes that the offenders 
participate in while in prison. One would have expected the offenders 
who are serving sentences for gross violations of the law of war to at 
least be exposed to the basics of the law of war when serving their 
sentences. The prison authorities should not wait for the offender to 
serve almost two-thirds of his sentence before such a relevant topic is 
introduced as one of the subjects they have to deal with.
3.2.2  Terms and conditions of the Conditional Early Release Agreement
For the President to make a conditional early release order, Article 8(C)
(i) requires the prisoner to agree to enter into and comply with the terms 
of the Conditional Early Release Agreement specified by the President. 
Annex C to the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of 
Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides for 
16 standard terms and conditions which have to be included in the 
Conditional Early Release Agreement all of which must be observed 
by the offender otherwise his early release order will be cancelled 
and he will be returned to prison to serve the balance of his sentence. 
Annex C also empowers the President to add ‘special conditions’ to the 
standard terms and conditions. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa50 
the President held that the prisoner may be released if he executes the 
Conditional Early Release Agreement in accordance with Annex C. The 
President also imposed a further five ‘Special Conditions which do not 
appear in Annex C.’51 Thus, on his release, Fofana will have to comply 
with 21 conditions; otherwise he will be arrested and imprisoned again. 
In Prosecutor v Senessie52 the President imposed only the 16 conditions 
under Annex C as he found ‘it unnecessary to impose further Special 
Conditions.’53 However, the offender was not released and had to serve 
50 Supra.
51 Supra at para 49.
52 Supra.
53 Supra at para 39.
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his sentence in full because ‘he was unwilling to abide by the terms 
imposed by the Court.’54
The question that has to be answered is this: why would an offender 
prefer to remain in prison and serve his full sentence as opposed to 
being released early? The answer to this question could be found 
in the standard terms and conditions that must be included in the 
Conditional Early Release Agreement. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to outline all 16 standard terms and conditions. However, some 
of them are worth mentioning. These are that the offender will not 
purchase, possess or consume alcohol; the Monitoring Authority is 
allowed to visit the offender at his residence, place of work or elsewhere 
as deemed appropriate by the Monitoring Authority; the offender 
will not commit any offence; the offender shall not privately incite 
or promote crime or behave in a way undermining public peace and 
security; and the offender shall not handle any weapon. One wonders 
as to why a person who was not convicted of an alcohol-related offence 
should be barred from purchasing, possessing or consuming alcohol, 
even in private. What if he purchases or consumes alcohol for medicinal 
purposes or for the purpose of fulfilling a cultural or religious ritual 
or practice? Would it not inconvenience the offender, his employer 
and fellow employees if the Monitoring Authority visited him at his 
place of work? What if the offender commits a minor offence such as a 
traffic offence, would he be in breach of the Conditional Early Release 
Agreement? What if the offender comes across a weapon and handles 
it for the purpose of taking it to the police station to report it?
The problem with the standard terms and conditions of early release 
is that their drafters adopted a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. It is argued 
that the best option would have been to list some of the terms and 
conditions that the President could impose on the offender and leave 
him with the discretion to determine which terms and conditions 
should be imposed on a given offender. This would enable the President 
to individualise the terms and conditions to suit the particular needs 
and circumstances of each offender. If this approach had been taken, 
there would not have been a need to provide for additional conditions. 
Most importantly, the offender would have been given an opportunity 
to explain to the President why a given condition should not be included 
in his release agreement. This one-size-fits-all approach needs to be 
changed so that the terms and conditions in the release agreements 
are tailored to suit the circumstances of a given offender. The fact that 
‘the President may, from time to time, review the conditions of the 
Conditional Early Release Agreement, proprio motu, or upon the request 
54 See RSCSL press release, ‘Moinina Fofana granted conditional early release, after 
six more months in prison’, available at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/
Press/2014/pressrelease-081114.pdf> (accessed on 3 November 2014).
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of the Convicted Person, the Monitoring Authority or the Prosecutor’55 
does not solve the problem mentions above. This is because this is 
more remedial – a ‘wait and see’ approach.
Another challenge is that sometimes the standard terms and 
conditions in the Conditional Early Release Agreement overlap with 
the special conditions. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa56 one of 
the standard terms and conditions is that the offender will refrain 
from contacting directly or indirectly those who were designated as 
witnesses or potential witnesses against him at the original trial. One 
of the special conditions imposed is that the offender ‘or any person 
acting with his consent or authority shall not, directly or indirectly, 
approach any of the in future, to directly or indirectly try to harm 
them, intimidate or otherwise interfere with them in any way.’57 
One of the standard terms and conditions of the Conditional Early 
Release Agreement is that the offender will ‘not publicly or privately 
… behave in a way which undermines public peace and security.’ One 
of the special conditions imposed on the offender is that he ‘shall not 
engage in secret meetings intended to plan civil unrest …’58 The other 
challenge with some special conditions that were imposed on Fofana 
is that one of them is vague and could be abused to have the offender 
arrested for violating the Conditional Early Release Agreement. This 
condition is that the offender ‘shall conduct himself honourably … 
in the community’59 What is considered honourable conduct by the 
offender may not be considered as such by the monitoring authority.
3.2.3  Suitable requested area of release
In terms of Article 8(C)(ii) of the Practice Direction on the Conditional 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone the President shall not grant early release if the convicted person 
is unable to provide a suitable requested area of release by reason of one 
or a combination of the following: absence of a suitable programme of 
supervision; or unwillingness of the community to accept the offender; 
or any other cause which the President finds renders the requested area 
of release unsuitable. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa60 the Court 
held that there is ‘an absolute prohibition against early release’ if the 
offender does not meet the requirements under Article 8(C)(ii).61 In the 
two cases considered by the Court so far, the President has not relied 
55 Article 11(B) of the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of 
Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
56 Supra.
57 Supra at para 49(ii).
58 Supra at para 49(iii).
59 Supra at para 49(iii).
60 Supra.
61 Supra at para 21.
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on one of the conditions under Article 8(C)(ii) to reject an application 
for conditional early release.
Offenders are supposed to be supervised by specially created 
monitoring units established by Sierra Leone Police.62 Members 
of civil society and members of the community are also permitted 
to participate in the offender’s supervision and monitoring.63 An 
offender identifies an area to which he would like to be released and 
the Court has to consider the views of the members of that community 
in deciding whether he qualifies for conditional early release. An 
offender is permitted to identify more than one area. For example, 
Fofana nominated two areas and the registrar sought the views of the 
community members in both these areas.64 Senessie also identified 
two areas ‘in the event that the President deems the first choice to be 
unsuitable.’65 In both cases the offenders identified areas in which they 
have strong family ties, such as wives, children and relatives, and also 
areas in which they have strong economic ties. They both identified 
areas where they lived before they were arrested and prosecuted before 
the SCSL. In both cases, the registrar submitted reports detailing the 
categories or groups of community members consulted on whether the 
offender should be released to that area, their views and the methods 
used to collect those views. The witnesses who gave evidence leading 
to the offenders’ convictions and the victims of the offenders’ crimes 
were also consulted. In both cases the members of the communities 
identified by the offenders overwhelmingly approved their return to 
those communities on their release.66 Some witnesses and victims 
did not express fear about the offender’s return whereas others did.67 
However, the President was of the view that through strict monitoring 
in terms of the Conditional Early Release Agreement, there were 
safeguards to ensure that the offenders did not harm the witnesses or 
the victims.68
3.2.4  Evidence of adequate means of financial support
Article 8(C)(iii) provides that the President shall not grant conditional 
early release if the offender ‘is unable to provide evidence of adequate 
means of financial support.’ What amounts to ‘adequate means of 
financial support’ is neither defined nor described in the Practice 
62 Supra at para 31.
63 Supra at para 24.
64 Supra at paras 22-24.
65 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at para 19.
66 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at paras 18-25; Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra 
at paras 21-28.
67 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 29; Prosecutor v Senessie supra at 
para 26.
68 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at paras 32-34; Prosecutor v Senessie supra 
at paras 28-30.
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Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. The result is that the offenders adduced 
evidence of their prospects of employment after release to show that 
they meet the criterion. Senessie submitted that he was ‘a carver by 
profession and earned his living and that of his family through sales 
of his artwork.’69 He added that ‘he served as a Priest in a local Church 
and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the National Secondary 
School, which positions entitled him to monetary allowances.’70 
Fofana submitted that ‘he would continue his vocations as a fisherman 
and agriculturist to support himself financially.’71 It is submitted that 
it is doubtful that the offenders on release would be able to continue 
with some of the jobs they used to do before their imprisonment. For 
example, it is unlikely that a person with a criminal record would 
continue to be a priest or a chairman of the board of governors of 
a secondary school. These are positions which ordinarily require 
people of high moral integrity and a person with a criminal record 
from an international criminal tribunal may not meet that criterion. 
It is also not very easy for a person who has been in prison for some 
years to continue with his trade as a carver, fisherman or agriculturist. 
The Court should scrutinise these submissions closely before holding 
that after release a person would indeed be able to financially support 
himself.
3.2.5  The offender’s behaviour during imprisonment
One of the factors that the President has to evaluate in deciding whether 
to allow the offender’s application for conditional early release is the 
offender’s participation in any remedial, educational, moral, spiritual 
or other programme to which he was referred within the prison.72 The 
President has had to rely on, inter alia, the reports from the prisons 
in which the offenders were serving their sentences at the time of 
the applications to assess whether or not the above criteria had been 
met. These reports are submitted to the President by the registrar who 
acquires them from the prison authorities of the state of enforcement in 
terms of Article 5(D) of the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early 
Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In 
the case of Fofana, the report (in the form of affidavits) was submitted 
by the Rwandan prison authorities73 and in the case of Senessie by 
Sierra Leonean prison authorities.74
69 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at para 20.
70 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at para 20.
71 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 22.
72 Article 8(D)(iv) of the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of 
Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
73 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 40.
74 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at para 32.
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The admissibility of the report in Senessie’s case was not challenged 
by the Prosecution because there was evidence that the report had been 
authored by the Director of Inmate Affairs of the Sierra Leone Prisons 
Department.75 However, the Prosecutor challenged the admissibility of 
the report from the Rwandan prison authorities on the ground that 
the affidavits did not indicate the ‘affiant’s position or experience to 
facilitate a determination of what weight to attach to them’.76 The 
President agreed with the Prosecution that the above information 
about the affiant of the affidavits was indeed lacking and added that 
it was ‘even less clear’ whether the affidavits had been sworn before a 
Commissioner of Oaths or a notary public.77 The Court added, however, 
that ‘it is not a requirement under Article 5(D) that any affidavits 
be filed.’78 The Court added that the prosecutor had not contended 
that the affidavits had been ‘filed by bogus prison authorities.’79 The 
President, in admitting the reports (affidavits) in evidence, held that 
‘[i]n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am satisfied that 
the reports came from authorised personnel of the Prison Authorities 
in Rwanda and expressly responded to the issues enumerated under 
Article 5(D).’80 The Fofana case raised a very serious issue with regards 
to the authenticity of the reports that are submitted by the prison 
authorities in the state of enforcement. In the light of the fact that 
these reports contain valuable information relating to the offender’s 
conduct in prison, there is a need to lay down rules that have to be 
followed to ensure that these reports meet certain requirements. For 
example, the rules could require that such reports should be signed by 
the head of the prison at which the offender is serving his sentence or 
by a person authorised by the head of prison to do so. Otherwise, such 
important reports may end up being written by a prison official who 
does not have a full understanding of their importance, which could 
affect their quality, hence resulting in their rejection by the court.
4  ARRESTING THE OFFENDER FOR VIOLATING A 
CONDITION IN THE CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE 
AGREEMENT
Article 12(A) of the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release 
of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides 
that:
75 Prosecutor v Senessie supra at para 32.
76 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 39.
77 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 40.
78 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 40.
79 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 40.
80 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa supra at para 40.
AYIHL_2014_Text.indd   168 26/03/2015   12:51
THE CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE OF OFFENDERS 169
In the event of the Monitoring Authority having reason to believe that 
the Convicted Person has violated a condition of the Conditional Early 
Release Agreement, the Convicted Person shall be arrested and transferred 
to the Special Court for detention pursuant to the Supervision Order and 
pending a decision of the President as to whether or not there is a probable 
cause to believe that the Convicted Person has violated a condition of his 
Conditional Early Release Agreement.
In not more than 24 hours after arrest, the registrar is supposed to 
inform the President of the offender’s detention and transmit to him 
the supporting evidence alleging that the offender violated a condition 
of the Conditional Early Release Agreement.81 The President has 48 
hours within which ‘to determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe that a violation has occurred.’82 If there is no probable cause to 
believe that the offender violated a condition in the Conditional Early 
Release Agreement, the President shall order his immediate release83 
otherwise a detailed procedure has to be followed in determining 
whether the offender violated a condition in the Conditional Early 
Release Agreement.84
There is no doubt that Article 12 was drafted with the good intention 
of ensuring that the offender complies with the conditions contained 
in the Conditional Early Release Agreement. The offender knows that 
failure to observe the conditions will lead to his arrest and detention 
and possibly cancellation of the release order. It is argued that there 
are at least three problems with Article 12(A). The first challenge is 
that the threshold that has to be met by the monitoring authority to 
arrest the offender is low – any reason to believe. The belief does not 
have to be based on compelling evidence. The belief does not have to 
be reasonable. The second problem is that the offender does not have 
an opportunity to show cause as to why he should not be arrested and 
detained for allegedly violating a condition in the agreement. The third 
problem, which flows from the second, is that irrespective of the nature 
or seriousness or otherwise of the alleged violation, the monitoring 
authority has no alternative but to arrest the offender. It is submitted 
that the best approach would have been to use arrest as a method of 
last resort or in cases where the offender is alleged to have committed 
a very serious violation of a condition in the Conditional Early Release 
Agreement. The best approach would have been to make more options, 
such as subpoena or summons, available to the monitoring authority. 
In Prosecutor v Senessie85 the local police station in the area where the 
offender was to be released was appointed as the ‘official Monitoring 
Authority’ and the Inspector-General of Police reassured the Court 
81 Article 12(C).
82 Article 12(D).
83 Article 12(E).
84 Article 12(F)–(J).
85 Supra.
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that his officials would closely monitor the offender.86 In Prosecutor v 
Fofana and Kondewa87 the Sierra Leone Police were also appointed as 
the monitoring authority.88 It appears that in the future all released 
offenders will be monitored by the Sierra Leone Police; this is because 
of the fact that there are ‘monitoring units which have been committed 
in written agreement and by the Inspector General of Police to assist 
the Court in the enforcement of its orders.’89 It is recommended that 
the police should be given other methods to resort to, other than arrest, 
in case of a suspected violation of a condition in the Conditional Early 
Release Agreement.
5  CONCLUSION
In this article I have briefly dealt with the relevant provisions of 
the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons 
Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. I have highlighted 
the two cases in which the Practice Direction on the Conditional Early 
Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone has 
been implemented so far. I have also made recommendations on how 
some of the loopholes in the Practice Direction on the Conditional 
Early Release of Persons Convicted by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone could be addressed. It is submitted, in conclusion, that these 
recommendations can positively contribute to the development of 
international penal law and practice.
86 Supra at para 29.
87 Supra.
88 Supra at paras 30-31.
89 Supra at para 31.
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